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Political Islam is a concept that draws attention in political science and 
international relations. Turkey is a unique model of the various usages of political 
Islam in a secular state. Moreover, unlike other Muslim countries, Turkey has a 
comparatively long history since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey. In this 
respect, the paper will analyze Turkish politics and parties from a historical 
perspective. I investigate the Democrat, Welfare, and Justice and Development 
Parties to understand political Islam in Turkey. I ask if these parties had an Islamist 
agenda and if they exploited Islam for political reasons. In order to find out which 
objectives of theirs have links to political Islam; I will examine party programs and 
policy implications of these three parties. Then, I will compare their agendas and try 
to find evidence of uses of Islam in foreign, education, and economic policies and 
religious&moral values in their agendas. After analyzing the parties, I will categorize 
them using the classification of Daniel Brumberg. I expect that this study will show 
differences among parties and the evolution of political Islam in Turkey over the 
decades. Also, this study can help by showing Turkeys sui generis characteristics; 




The relationship between religion and politics has been one of the most 
important topics in human history. All religions have connected themselves with 
politics in different patterns. As Ayoob (2008:14) says, politics and religion can be a 
heady mixture; this is demonstrated in all religious traditions, not merely in Islam. 
Islam, as one of the largest religions in the world, has long been part of the research 
agenda in political science and international relations at different times and for 
different countries. Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, the impacts of 
Islam and its relations with politics have become much more observable in politics 
and society in the Muslim world. However, in spite of all these different countries and 
their experiences with Islam in politics, there is a tendency to label each of them with 
the same classifications, such as fundamentalist vs. reformist, or Islamist vs. Islamic.  
 
Yavuz and Esposito (2003:xvii) argue that there is no single pattern of 
interaction between religion and politics in Islam, but rather several competing ones. 
Moreover, among the varying patterns, there are dissimilarities in the distribution of 
power, functions, and relations among institutions according to each countrys 
specific history and politics. In this regard, Turkey is an interesting and important 
example in terms of its relations with Islam as a strict secular nation-state.  
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According to Gozaydin (Jung&Raudvere (eds.), 2008:160), political Islam, a 
modern ideology rooted in the nineteenth century, has become more and more visible 
in the political arena in Turkey. It should be noted that, the importance of religion 
and tradition in Turkey has always been there but it has been paid more attention in 
recent decades as a result of a resurgence of Islam in the world and the Middle East. 
In this study, I will show the evolution of political Islam in Turkey since the 1950s 
until today. While I study the impact of political Islam in Turkey, I will focus on three 
Turkish political parties, namely the Democrat Party (DP-Demokrat Parti), the 
Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi), and the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti-
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), all of which were in government at different times.  
 
The purpose of this study is to categorize the three parties under the term of 
political Islam. Specifically, I will look at the party programs and policy 
implementations in order to find out if and how these parties politicized Islam. I use a 
different categorization which is more detailed than such classic definitions as 
fundamentalist vs. reformist.  
 
This introduction is followed by a literature review, which includes a 
definition of political Islam, and its classification. Then, in Chapter 2, I continue with 
a detailed discussion about the evolution of Turkish political Islam and the 
backgrounds of the three parties. Next, I present my research design. Later, I 
categorize the three parties according to the classification of political Islam that is 
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introduced earlier. Lastly, I end with some concluding remarks about the differences 





People within otherwise diverse cultures often try to combine their religions with 
their political ideologies in order to give meanings to their lives. Throughout the 
human history, the relationship between religion and politics has been one of the most 
complex forces shaping the world order. As Fuller (2003, xiii) argues, when religion 
is linked with politics, two of the most vital elements of human concern come 
together. This conjunction can be for better or for worse: both religion and politics 
have consistently exploited each other across the web of history. 
 
As such, religion is an important and popular phenomenon throughout history, 
because it encompasses our values, aspirations, and vision of life, our quest to find 
meaning in our existence, our concerns for what is right and wrong in this world 
(Fuller, 2003, xiii). In the contemporary world, religion is on the rise once again 
(Moussali 1991); Islam has become particularly visible both domestically/regionally 
(Hamas and Hezbollah) and internationally (Al-Qaeda).  
 
In this chapter, I first discuss Islam and its relationship with politics. Then, I 
define what political Islam is, its history, and some basic characteristics of political 
Islam as an ideological tool. Finally, I discuss various classifications of Islamist 
ideology in politics and try to present one of them as the most explanatory power in 
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terms of Turkish political features. In the following chapters, I ultimately apply this 
classification to the Islamic political movements in Turkey. 
 
Islam and Politics 
Islam is one of the largest religions in the world. Although Islam is seen by most 
observers as merely a religious doctrine, it is rather a complete system that gives 
general clues to its believers how to construct social as well as political aspects of 
life. As Wright (1992: 3) aptly puts Islam is the only major monotheistic religion 
that offers not only a set of spiritual beliefs but a set of rules by which to govern 
society. Similarly Fuller (2003: 17) also argues that Islam is a sense of inspiration, 
explanation, guidance, solace, and fulfillment for life in this world and beyond.  In 
other words, one can argue that Islam, as a religion, has a direct relationship with 
culture, politics, economics, and social relationship. As such, Islam inarguably has a 
civilizational aspect to it; Islam means the whole civilization that has grown up 
under the aegis of that religion (Lewis, 1996: 53).  
 
For some, Islam has been so influential that it led to important revolutions in 
the world. For instance, according to Wright (1996: 65), Islam preaches equality, 
justice, and human dignity-ideals that played a role in developments as diverse as 
Christian reformation of the sixteenth century, the American and French Revolutions 
of the eighteenth century, and even the liberation theology of the twentieth century. 
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This impact of Islam, however, has not been imposed by force, because Islam indeed 
welcomes diversity and calls for coexistence with other cultures (Wright, 1996: 75). 
 
Others argued that Islams emphasis on social and communal identity is the 
reason for its social and political impact in peoples lives (Gulalp, 2003: 382). Thus, 
while discussing Islams role in a society, I argue that it is useful to think about the 
leaders and rulers who use their versions of Islam to exploit their societies 
economically, politically, and culturally. Furthermore, Islam might adopt different 
meanings depending on who interprets and implements it. In other words, as 
Sadowski argues (2006: 216), Islam is a world of many histories, many peoples, 
many languages, traditions, schools of interpretations, proliferating developments, 
disputations, cultures, and countries. Interpretations and implementations may create 
differences in the depiction of Islam, as Cinar says (2008: 17), as anti-modern, anti-
democratic, and mostly violent political movements based primarily on the portrayal 
of Islam as an essential dysfunctional religion for both modernity and democracy.  
 
There are many reasons why societies want to be ruled by Islamic rules or 
Sharia, which means the way of Islamic law based on the Quran1 and Sunnah2. 
According to Fuller (2003: 56), Sharia means way or path. It states the path 
                                                
1 Quran is the book revealed to the Prophet Muhammad as a Divine instruction to all mankind 
(Choudhury and Malik, 1992:2). 
 
2 Sunnah are the sayings, practices, traditions and exegesis of the Quran by the Prophet Muhammad 
(Choudhury and Malik, 1992:2). 
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toward understanding God. As Moussalli argues (1999: 19), the legitimacy of an 
Islamic state is rooted in a general philosophy of life and a particular moral and 
political philosophy. To put it in another way, Islamic state and Islamic law aim to 
lead and rule society with a political and moral understanding of the Quran and 
Hadith3.  On the other hand, many believe that there are many different ways or paths 
to understand God, which means everyone can find and build his or her own Sharia in 
order to access to God. These paths will be discussed later; here first I define political 
Islam for the purposes of this study. 
 
There is actually no ambiguity at all when we talk about political Islam as a political 
regime. As such, political Islam can be defined as the belief that the Koran and the 
Hadith have something important to say about the way society and government 
should be ordered (Fuller, 2002: 49). For Hermann (2003: 266), there is an 
agreement in the West that political Islam stands for an ideology derived from 
theology, for politics derived from faith, for shaping society according to the values 
and rules of Islam, even imposing them on the public. However, sometimes political 
Islam is called Islamization which means the method by which more Islamically 
oriented states are to be implemented (Esposito, 1998: 342). Overall, there is an 
agreement that political Islam is an attempt and specific way to rule and organize 
society with the Quran and Hadith. Political Islam is a political activity in the name of 
Islam. One can argue that there is not a difference between Islam and political Islam 
                                                
3 Hadith are the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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in the sense that they both say something about lives of people. But there is a big 
difference between Islam as a religion and Islam as o political ideology. According to 
Esposito (Khan (ed.), 2007:29), the difference between divine laws and principles and 
human interpretations should be emphasized. The former is duties to God than can 
not be changed, and the latter is a set of regulations for society that can be changed as 
time changes.  
 
However, political Islam is, as Ayoob argues (2008:15), despite some similarities in 
objectives and even in the rhetoric they employ, something that changes by the 
political activities undertaken by Islamists are largely determined by the context 
within which they operate.      
 
It is important to emphasize that political Islam is not a static phenomenon. 
Because Islam has something to say about political and social order, and their change, 
political Islam is something that grows, expands, evolves, and diversifies according to 
people who use it (Fuller, 2003: 14). In addition, the definition of political Islam is 
not as important as its implications and actors who use them in purpose. Therefore, 
political Islam is a political system that can be changed in its nature and capacity by 
time, actor, country, and subject. Similarly, Cinar and Duran (2008) note that 
although the process of reading Islamic text and tradition has been constant, Islamic 
political thoughts are shaped and transformed by cultural factors, economic 
structures, and political institutions in which they operate. For Yavuz (2003, p. 23), 
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this can be observed in the way Islamic movements seek to reconstitute identities, 
institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through 
participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, educational, and economic 
spheres. For this reason, I try to explain Turkish political Islam by using the three 
Turkish political parties: the Democrat Party, the Welfare Party, and the Justice and 
Development Party.  
 
There is an agreement regarding the features of an Islamic state or a state that 
can be called state of political Islam. In this study, it is important to establish 
certain features of state of political Islam in order to compare the three different 
Turkish political parties to see whether it would be any proof that these three political 
parties have used Islam in their policies and policy implications. According to 
Esposito (1998: 323), there are seven common characteristics of an Islamic state 
which are; 1) The state is the means by which an Islamic order or way of life is 
fostered and regulated. 2) The Islamic state is primarily a community of believers 
bound by a common faith and commitment to their divinely mandated mission to 
obey God and spread Gods just rule and governance throughout the world. 3) The 
consensus of the community is the source of authority regarding the particular form 
of Islamic government as well as the selection and removal of the head of state. 4) 
The state is based upon Quranic prescription and early Islamic practice. 5) The ruler 
is to govern according to and assure implementation of the Shariah. 6) The ruler is 
required to consult with representatives of the people. But, the ruler is not bound to 
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follow their advice. 7) The checks on the rulers power are the limits of the Shariah. 
By checking these basic principles of political Islam, it might be easier to make a 
comment about countries government types. Also, in order to understand and 
compare the process of political Islam in Turkey, the principles might be more helpful 
and rational. 
 
The Revival of Political Islam in the 20th Century 
There is a consensus in the literature that the nineteenth century was the beginning of 
revival of Islam as a political ideology (Sadowski, 2006). Specifically, Cinar and 
Duran (2008:18) argue that this emergence occurred as an attempt to rebuild the 
great civilization of Islam in the face of increasing Western-cum-Christian dominance 
and colonialism. Likewise, Dagi (2005: 22) says, by the nineteenth century, the 
West had penetrated the Islamic lands politically, militarily, and economically. Thus 
the question of how to stop the advancement of the West was a practical and political 
issue. Secondly, the growing superiority of the West put the Islamic civilization in 
question. By the nineteenth century, the Islamic (Sunni and Shia) world shared a 
similar negative view of the West as soulless, godless, materialistic, mechanical, 
corrupt, greedy, selfish,,secularist (Cinar and Duran, 2008: 19). The awakening of 
Islam as a political, social, and cultural project against the West can be called 
reconstruction of Islamic identity in modern world. 
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 While the reconstruction process began in the 19th century, Islam as a political 
ideology has been rather more visible in the world arena in the 20th century, 
especially in its last quarter. For Gulalp (2001) this relates to a global decline in the 
power and influence of nation-states. He argues that especially with the difficulties 
nation-states faced in regulating their national economies, there was an increase in 
sub-national separatist movements (Gulalp, 2001: 435). This trend definitely worked 
to the advantage of religious movements around the world and particularly in the 
Muslim world. For instance, Hamass challenge to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization and its ultimate accession to power can be attributed to such a process 
by attracting the Palestinians with the social services that it provided to many 
impoverished Palestinians. Therefore, as a result of these tendencies, in Muslim 
countries, Islam has been reconstructed as a revivalist ideology against the 
domination of Western world. 
 
 The rise of political Islam has been an important and powerful movement in 
the world and the Middle East; political Islam gained even more power in the 1980s.  
As mentioned above, the economy has a lot to do with this process because the neo-
liberal restructuring of national economies have created both winners and losers. It 
would not be surprising that this process has made religion more attractive 
particularly, to the losers. Indeed, Onis (2001: 282) claims that political Islam, in 
much of the Middle East, can be regarded as a regional manifestation representing the 
interests of losers, groups that are excluded from material benefits of globalization. 
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This does not mean that all Muslims were losers; although many Muslim societies 
benefited from globalization, some are still excluded from political and economic 
power. As a result, it made sense for these people to search for new meanings that are 
hidden in their own heritages. 
 
Esposito (1998) highlights the increased impact of Islam in the Muslim world 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Esposito (1998) also recognizes the 
increased importance of Islam in the Muslim world; he argues that religion did not 
recede in the Muslim world but rather emerged in the politics of countries (158). 
Likewise Filali-Ansary says (1996: 76), Islam, one of the major world religions, may 
be living through a turning point in its history, one that will bring it face-to-face with 
the challenges of the human condition at the end of the twentieth century. The 
twentieth century is the time of reasons for the new preference for ballots over 
bullets (Wright, 1992: 2).  
 
For Islam the twentieth century was the time for reevaluation and 
reconstruction; Esposito (1998: 159) summarizes the realization of Islam as a life 
saver for Muslim countries;  
 
In Islamic countries, Islams glorious political and cultural past had been reversed 
by European colonial rule; political independence had not significantly improved the 
political and socioeconomic condition of Muslim countries. Most continued to be 
subservient to the West both politically and culturally. European colonialism was 
replaced by American neocolonialism. Moreover, political leaders failed to establish 
a legitimate, effective public order and to address adequately the profound 
socioeconomic disparities in wealth and class in most Muslim countries. This was 
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reflected in Muslim literature in the late 1960s, in its growing criticism of the West 
and its concern to reclaim historical and cultural identity.  
 
It is arguable that some developments in the 1970s (such as the Egyptian 
victory over Israel in 1973, the Arab oil embargo, and the Islamic revolution in Iran) 
gave some more confidence to the Muslim world against Western superiority. These 
events can be considered as precursors to later developments. In that respect, like 
many others do, Wright (1992) too focuses on the late 1980s as he discusses the 
revival of Islam. He argues that After centuries marked mainly by dormancy, 
colonialism, and failed experiments with Western ideologies, many Islamists feel they 
have a mandate to create constructive alternatives (1). The Islamic world has needed 
a new acceleration in order to catch up with the new century. As a result, a growing 
number of Islamists attempted to combine moral and religious values with modern 
life, political competition, and free markets and the spread of democracy. As Takeyh 
(2001: 68) argues, political Islam as a viable reform movement might have petered 
out were it not for one minor detail: The rest of the world was changing.  
 
Overall, some common themes emerge in the explanations of the revival of 
political Islam. For Esposito (1998: 160-161), these are (1) the failure of the West and 
the need to throw off Western political and cultural domination, which fosters 
secularism, materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy; (2) the need to return to Islam in 
order to restore a lost identity, moral purpose, and character; (3) an emphasis on the 
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unity and totality of Islam, tawhid4; (4) a call for the reintroduction of Shariah law for 
establishing a more Islamic state and society.  
 
In conclusion, globalization, the intrusion of Western culture into Muslim 
societies, and the neo-liberal economic policies and their consequences on Muslim 
countries were the reasons for the rise of political Islam in the 20th century. The idea 
that Islamization could be a solution for creating a new generation with an identity-
constituting orientation was the beginning of re-exploring Islam in order to re-
construct Islamic civilization. It is, however, essential to reiterate that in this process 
Islam as a political ideology revived in various forms. As argued above, this had to do 
with the fact that Islam as a political tool makes different promises to different 
people. 
 
It is crucial to explain and classify the degree of the usage of Islamic 
law/ideology in politics. As Wittes says (2008: 7), there is a definitional minimalism 
in the literature of political Islam. Using and applying different descriptions and tags 
for different types of Islamic law/ideology for diverse groups and religious 
interpretations make more meaningful and easier to understand different political 
perspectives in political Islam. Moreover, As Ayoob (2008) points out, even within 
the same country uses and implications of political Islam can vary. Therefore, it is not 
logical to try to find common grounds for political Islam for different countries. If it 
                                                
4 Tawhid refers to the unity and oneness of God. 
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can be done, the appearances of political Islam in politics will be clearer and it 
provides a clear understanding of the degree of usage of political Islam.  
 
Classifications of Political Islam 
There are a number of different terms (which occasionally overlap) that describe 
Islamic political movements (Fuller, 2003: 47). However, various descriptions of 
political Islam (such as Islamist, Islamic, reformist, fundamentalist radical, liberal) 
refer to the discourse and activities that give Islam a central role and rebuild society 
according to what are believed to be Islamic principles (Celik, 2003: 61). An 
accurate classification of political Islam is indeed the key to understanding its 
different forms. With respect to this research, an accurate classification is critical, in 
that it would help distinguish variances among different political parties in Turkey. 
As Kubba (2003: 45) argues, to find and examine different political prospects under 
different names prevent tendency to conflate and equate such a diverse attributes, 
practices, and institutions. In other words, for an academic as well as strategic 
purpose, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish different Islamic Shariah and not to 
paint with a broad brush, which will inevitably lead to bad analysis and bad policy 
(Khan (ed.), 2007:4). 
 
The range of political Islam is broad, and not a single force (Wright, 1996: 65-
66). According to Wright (1996), degrees of Islamic law or Sharia can be classified 
into two main groups: fundamentalists and Islamists. The former group can be 
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described with violence and aggressiveness against change. Fundamentalists are 
motivated by political or economic insecurity, questions of identity, or territorial 
disputes (66). The term Islamist, on the other hand, allows for the forward-looking, 
interpretive, and often innovative and desire for change (66). Islamists are also 
called Islamic reformers who shape thought about long-term issues. The goal of the 
Islamists is to modernize and democratize the existing political and economical 
systems with a combination of Islam.  
 
While such a simple distinction between fundamentalists and reformists can 
be confusing, since Islamic doctrine allows for different interpretations and therefore 
different opinions on Sharia and its principles (Abootalebi, 1999: 2), it is definitely a 
crucial first step to approach political Islam. Indeed, various other similar 
classifications exist that distinguish between fundamentalist/radical/Islamists on the 
one hand and reformist/modernist/liberal/Islamic on the other. Now I discuss these 
two groups and the various ways used to describe them.  
 
Fundamentalists 
According to Lewis (1996: 54), fundamentalists are who introduce ideas 
unknown alike to the Koran, the hadith, or the classical doctrines of the faith. In 
other words, it may be seen as a manifestation of the mass social movements 
articulating religious and civilizational aspirations and questioning issues surrounding 
the morality of technology, the capitalist mode of distribution  (Moussalli, 1999: 2). 
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Fundamentalists generally oppose the Western world and economic, political, and 
social institutions that are created by the West. Fundamentalism is a kind of reaction 
to the West because according to the fundamentalists the sovereignty belongs only to 
God, in contrast to the Western ideology in which an individual is at the center. 
According to the fundamentalist ideology, Western civilization violates Gods order 
and divinity. Indeed, fundamentalists criticize not only the Western world but also 
other Muslims for imitating Western civilization. Yet, fundamentalists also 
incorporate a great deal of modernity and innovation (Abootalebi, 1999: 1). As 
much as they reject the Western type of lifestyle, political and economical systems, 
fundamentalists accept science and technology to use in their own developments.   
 
 Sometimes fundamentalists are considered as traditionalists, or are described 
as radicals. Therefore, there exists an ambiguity in the usage of fundamentalist. There 
are, however, certain differences among the three terms. First, I discuss the 
distinctions between fundamentalists and traditionalists. According to Fuller (2003: 
48), traditionalists have no specific agenda of political change, do not seek to shake 
up the system, and are generally accepting of existing political authority as a reality 
of life. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, are uncomfortable with living in modern 
ages and try to live by what the Quran says originally (literal interpretation), without 
any interpretations, critiques, etc. Hence, fundamentalists have problems with 
secularism and democracy, and aim to get rid of the Western influences on a society 
by reestablishing Islam in its original form. Likewise, Traditional Islam, for Pipes 
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(1997), means a desire to go back to the pure and simple ways of Prophet 
Muhammad. Traditional Islam gives importance to the relation between God and 
man, not God and the state. However, for fundamentalists, the relation between the 
creator and the state is at the center, so they do not see themselves as traditional but 
as engaged in a highly novel enterprise (Pipes, 2007:55). Islam therefore becomes a 
way to power for fundamentalists. As Roy says, for Islamists, Islam is an ideological 
tool to maintain political power.  
 
Fundamentalists and radicals also differ from each other. The distinction, 
according to Fuller (2003: 51-52), lies in the degrees of violence used by the two 
groups. First, it is essential to describe what radicals defend. Radicals do not oppose 
only Western world but also see Muslim countries that use Western political systems 
as their enemies. In addition to these, radicals do not think that there is a chance for 
reconciliation within the Muslim world. They symbolize a political breakaway, and 
therefore use the term revolution in order to define themselves. Radicals do want 
political revolution to transform society immediately. In other words, theoretically, 
they do not wait for a long cultural and social transformation, they believe in the 
urgency of revolution. That said, as Fuller (2003) puts it, radicals accept narrow, 
literal, and intolerant interpretations of Islam but most go an extra step in either 
promoting utopian visions of a pan-Islamic state or advocating violent action. 




For this category of political Islam, one can find labels as reformed Islam, 
modern Islam, positive Islam, the Islam of modernity, enlightened Islam (Filali-
Ansary, 2003: 19).  The most significant difference between reformists and 
fundamentalists is derived from their world views. In other words, reformists want 
change and modernity instead of tradition, and seek progress and development against 
stagnation. As Fuller argues (2003: 54), although both fundamentalism and 
modernism are going back to roots in their insistence on change of understanding of 
Islam, the methodologies and conclusions are vastly different. To put it in other 
words, while change means going back to the 7th century for fundamentalists, it is 
about a redefinition of Islam with words of new world for reformists. This is because, 
the reformers contend that human understanding of Islam is flexible, and that 
Islams tenets can be interpreted to accommodate and even encourage pluralism. 
Reformists disagree with those who argue Islam has a single, definitive essence that 
admits of no change in the face of time, space, or experience (Wright, 1996: 67). 
Significantly different from fundamentalists, for reformists, while the religion itself is 
important, the capacity of the ideology to deliver tangible economic goods and basic 
political rights (Abootalebi, 1999: 3) is also important. In other words, as 
Fuller(2003: 54) says, modernists accept the near-universal values of democracy, 
human rights, pluralism, and vibrant civil society as fully compatible with Islam and 
inherent in Islams own original multiculturalism.  
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 As mentioned above, there are many definitions for actors that use 
political Islam as an alternative way of politics. However, all these definitions overlap 
in somewhere and are defined by different words, such as Islamist and Islamic. These 
two are also worth explaining because it is one of the most common ways to 
understand differences among actors that rule with political Islam. As Cayir 
(2008:64) says, what differentiated Islamism from Islam, and Islamist from a 
Muslim was that former categories referred to a new consciousness and new agencies 
involving a desire to reshape the modern world according to Islamic principles, while 
the latter signified a more passive historical and cultural stance on the part of the 
religion and its believers. In addition to this, as Roy (1994) argues, Islamist ideology 
aims to create a new society, a new state as an alternative to Western democracy and 
communism. It means that an Islamist has a dream to build a new society with the 
religion in all terms. On the other hand, the term Islamic means anything Muslim 
or relating to the religion of Islam. As such, Schwedler (1998: 29) aptly puts that all 
Islamists are therefore Muslims; not all Muslims are Islamists. Schwedler too notes 
that the term Islamist describes the subset of Muslims (followers of the Islamic 
faith) who seek to promote an Islamic agenda for social, political and economic 
reform.  
 
 Gole (1997:47) explains Islamism as an indication of the reappropriation of a 
Muslim identity and values as a basis for an alternative social and political agenda, 
which means it is a kind of mixture of tradition and modernity, religion and 
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secularism, community and religion. To be Islamic is an attempt to give Muslim 
people changes and guidance to be more liberal, educated, modern, and urban. 
However, Islamists, as Roy (1994) and Fuller (2003) define, as a group of people see 
religion as a political ideology and use it for the reconstruction of all aspects of 
society and politics with Islamic rules. Therefore, it can be summarized that the term 
Islamic can be used instead of reformist/modernist or liberal Islam; and Islamist can 
be used instead fundamentalist.  
In other words, to be an Islamist is an indicator of usage of political Islam. In other 
words, to use Islam in politics to reshape every aspect of public and private life refers 
to people, groups, or movements called as an Islamist. 
Overall, given these differences both within and between fundamentalists/ 
Islamists and reformist/Islamic, I argue that a classification of political Islam should 
reflect more than a simple dichotomization. Thus, I find Brumbergs (1997) 
classification a valid approach. For Brumberg, there are four types of Islamist 
rhetoric: 
1) Reformist fundamentalism can be characterized as utilitarian. Because 
reformist fundamentalists see politics as a vehicle for realizing the collective 
moral view or to establish the ethical state with Gods commandments 
(1997:17). According to them, state is only the political expression of an 
Islamic society. Their long-term goal is to create a unified ethical order. 
Generally they use reformist vision to get allies within regimes and society. 
According to Onis (2001:283), their claims are not compatible with the 
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democratic game and norms of power sharing, except over a certain transition 
period. Their ultimate aim is to replace secular constitutional norms with the 
Sharia. This group composes the biggest class in political Islam. 
2) Militant or Radical fundamentalism rejects the notion of gradualism and 
demands the forced imposition of an Islamic state (1997:17). Thus, they use 
violence as a threat to democratic order.   
3) Strategic modernism advances a liberal democratic vision of the state. Onis 
(2001) calls them as Islamic liberals. Their aim is a transformation towards 
democracy. They believe that states should exist in order to protect the rights 
of people to express their vision freely. They are not aiming to create an 
Islamic civilization as an alternative to the Western one; rather they seek to 
create a religious freedom in a democratic and secular environment. This 
group is quite rare in the Islamic world.  
4)  Tactical modernism entails the selective use of modernist themes to advance 
a fundamentalist agenda. It is used to get and maintain support of social 
groups. Reformist fundamentalism and tactical modernism are closely linked 
with each other. The former tries to make allies from different professional 
classes, so it uses modern terms, symbols, and rhetoric often. However, it is 
all related with Islamic law, society, and unity. They do not support revolution 





After looking at different categorizations of political Islam such as fundamentalist vs. 
reformist or Islamist vs. Islamic, there is a need for a new and detailed explanation. 
Therefore, I will apply Brumbergs classification in order to understand various 
appearances of political Islam in party programs of the three parties selected from 
Turkey. I contend that the three Turkish parties studied here differ among each other 
and can not be simply grouped into one, single political Islam as is often done. In 
contrast to such simplistic labels as Islamist, Islamic, fundamentalist, here I provide a 
detailed and comparative description of these parties. For instance, the Economist 
labeled the Welfare Party as Turkeys new Islamist party (May 28, 1998), and later 
described the JDP as mildly Islamist (July 17, 2008). Notwithstanding these, I 
argue that there exist differences among the DP, the WP, and the JDP. 
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TURKISH ISLAMISM & HISTORY OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY 
 
Religion has been used as a political tool for many centuries, to such an extent 
that religion and politics have become different parts of the same puzzle. In addition, 
both religion and politics have been a crucial part of human history, they have shaped 
the world and conversely have been shaped by the world. As Vertigans (2003: 5) says 
religion is most tangible within politics. Turkey has a similar story but in a different 
script. As Yavuz (2003:7) puts it while the politicization of Islamic identity is by no 
means unique to Turkey, the Turkish case is a particular importance for 
understanding this phenomenon. 
 
In Turkish politics, using Islam as a political instrument is not a recent 
phenomenon as religion has always attracted the Turkish voters. From the Democratic 
Party (DP) in the 1950s to the AK Party (JDP) today, the exploitation of religion in 
Turkish politics has taken different shapes. However, as Vertigans (2003: 5) argues 
all the parties have to varying degrees courted religious support, but ultimately none 
have made fundamental concessions against secularization.  
 
Religion, according to Yildiz (2008:41), is in the fabric of Turkish society, 
and it continues to be one of the determinants of Turkish politics, introducing some 
changes into society while it itself undergoes an evolution of its own. Indeed, the 
role of Islam in the roots of Turkish politics can be traced back to the 1850s. 
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Specifically, the struggle between state and religion in Turkey has lasted since early 
years of nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire started the reform movements. 
During the Ottoman Empire era, religion was at the center of the state and society. 
However, by the early 19th century, following the rapid changes in the Western world, 
the Empire had started to reform and secularize the state. That was the beginning of 
the fight between secularists and Islamic traditionalists.  
 
In this chapter, I first discuss the relationship between Islam and politics in 
Turkey from historical and political perspectives. Then, I discuss the histories of the 
three political parties and their relations with the religion.  
 
The Relationship of Turkish Politics with Islam 
Turkish Islam derives from the fact that Islams hegemony was spread by the 
Ottoman bureaucracy with kind of a positivist thought which is the knowledge that is 
based on scientific methods and experiments. Islam had not been an ideology until the 
late nineteenth century. Although the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state and 
Sharia was the foundation of its legal system, in practice the implication of Sharia 
was very limited to the realm of private law that encompassed family law and 
contract law (Todays Zaman, January 27, 2008). With the establishment of the 
Republic, Turkish nationalism de-emphasized Islam as part of the Turkish identity. 
As Cinar and Duran (Cizre (ed.), 2008:21) say no other Muslim country in the 
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Middle East or the North Africa has disassociated its regime from Islam in the same 
thorough way as Kemalism5 did. 
 
The competition between state and religion in Turkey has been continuing 
since before the formation of Turkish Republic and specifically since the nineteenth 
century of the Ottoman Empire (Turam, 2007). As a result of the rapid changes in the 
Western world in military, technology, economics, politics, etc. the Empire had to 
take some serious and immediate precautions in order to compete with Western rivals 
on the same track. That was the beginning of the reform and secularization process in 
the Ottoman Empire. As Yilmaz (Todays Zaman, January 27, 2008) says, during 
the 1850s and 1860s, secularization acquired a legal and institutional face through 
the introduction of new, European-inspired codes, such as the criminal code and the 
commercial code All of these reforms have started a new conflict between 
secularists and traditionalists. The fight has flared after the establishment of the 
secular Turkish state. Since then, the main target of the republic was to create a 
homogeneous society without any differences until the multi-party system was 
introduced in 1946.  
 
                                                
5 Kemalism can be defined as an anti-political and state-centered paradigm that claims that the 
Turkish society and public sphere is homogenous and that displays distaste for political representation 
of differences (Cinar and Duran, 2008:26). Kemalism is the Turkish foundational ideology. It aims 
for a controlled-modernization project by its own understanding of modernism. Thus means that 
Kemalism has both Westernism and anti-Westernism, liberalism and national unity, and democracy 
and secularism.  
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Opposition to the radical secularization policies of the westernizers in 
republican Turkey played a central role in the construction of an Islamic political 
identity. The westernization process and policies of the republican period (Kemalist 
design to reform society and politics along a secularist line) resulted in the exclusion 
of Islamic leaders, groups, and thought from the centers of power, eliminating 
appearances of Islam in the public sphere (Dagi, 2005:23). Likewise, as Gole (1997) 
argues, the Turkish experience of political Islam has been a kind of conflict between 
secularists and Islamists. Since the 19th century, all of the modernizing and 
secularizing processes in social, political, economic, and military areas of life were 
done by the Turkish elites. While the Turkish secular Kemalists have taken the 
secularism process as a social engineering project which was to re-shape the whole 
Turkish society in terms of secular rules, the parties of the Turkish political Islamic 
movement have been a big challenge for the process of Kemalism.  
 
The relationship between the ruling class and society in the Turkish republic 
can be defined as a center-periphery relation (Mardin, 1973). According to this 
definition, Kemalism represented the center, and the periphery was the people who 
have been distant or opposed to the Kemalist state and suffered political, economic, 
and ideological exclusion. Therefore, Turkish political Islam can be described as a 
movement of the counter-elites who are aiming for upward mobility in opposition to 
the secularist social actors privileged by their proximity to the Kemalist state and 
ideology (Gulalp, 2001:434). As a result of this struggle, Islam [has been] 
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integrated into Turkish political arena as oppositional forces (Cinar and Duran, 
2008:19). 
 
As such, the history of political Islam in Turkey can be characterized as a 
struggle of the periphery (the counter elite) against the center (that was occupied by 
the Republican elites) for taking a part in the state6. For instance, it can be said that 
the Welfare Party (WP) tagged itself as the periphery against the center. The party 
might be the beginning of the history of political Islam in Turkey. The party fit the 
classic definition of a populist movement as the mobilization of the urban poor by 
the minority segments of the upper and middle classes into action against the status 
quo (Gulalp, 2001:435).    
 
Turkeys experience with political Islam is a result of these ups and downs. To 
clarify, socio-economic and political developments (such as, high inflation and 
unemployment, urbanization, emergence of various ideologies and new social 
classes) in Turkey are reflected in, and complicated by, many ideological battles 
among multiple competing political parties. As these transformations relate to the 
issue of political Islam, Mecham (2004: 354) claims that moderating changes in 
Turkeys political Islam movement took place over a series of parties and over an 
extensive period of political learning. As Grigoriadis (2007) argues, although the 
                                                
6 According to Tepe (Yavuz (ed.), 2006:110), the secular elite has traditionally represented state-
created bourgeoisie, namely military and civil servants, while the counter-elite has represented petite 
bourgeoisie, the urban poor, and rural sectors. 
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reform process of political Islam in Turkey is not completed yet, it seems promising 
that a Muslim society can be ruled by Western style liberal democracy. This is why 
Turkish political Islam chose to participate in the electoral process, hoping to affect 
change within the existing political culture. Therefore, it kept itself away from the use 
of violence and terrorism (Cinar and Duran, 2008:23). This is why Turkish Islamism 
has never felt the need to explain what Sharia or an Islamic order entails. Also, 
Turkey has never been formally colonized like other Muslim countries. Hence the 
hatred against the West is not as strong as in other Muslim countries. On the contrary, 
Turkey has a strong orientation towards the West. With the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, the Westernization Process of the society, state, army, which had 
been started in the Ottoman Empire era, has gained acceleration.   
 
Islamist political movements are not about individual liberties, but are about 
national liberation; they are not interested in participation but power and mass 
mobilization, moreover, their motivations are not for democracy, but anger and 
authenticity (Kramer 1997:163). When these explanations are considered, in Turkish 
politics, there are not those kinds of Islamist political movements. Thus, the 
Democratic Party, Welfare Party, and Justice and Development Party have to be 
classified into a totally different category of political Islam. In addition, as discussed 
above, if the term Islamist-Islamic or fundamentalist-reformist connotes such a strong 
meaning, is it possible that all of the parties in Turkey shared the same aspirations and 
a desire to establish a religious order? Or, is it likely that these parties were labeled as 
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Islamist parties without paying attention to their policies? I discuss these questions in 
the following pages. 
 
The Democrat Party (DP) 
The Democrat Party was founded in 1946 in opposition to the Republican Peoples 
Party (RPP) which was Ataturks party and proclaimed itself protector of secularism 
in Turkey. Before the multi-party system, there was an authoritarian RPP rule that 
reshaped the whole Turkish society with its secularist policies. Moreover, the RPP era 
aimed to create a homogenous nation under the name of Turk and deemphasized 
Islam as part of the Turkish identity (Cinar and Duran, 2008:21). Therefore, the 
depiction of Islam as the other or as the symbol of non-modern orientalness has 
always constituted the essential substance of the secular states legitimacy itself 
(Cizre, 2008:1).   
 
Following the 27 years of etatism and a patriarchal regime, the people had 
opted for a more liberal regime as promised by the DP (Geyikdagi, 1984:73). The 
success of the DP was in its reaction against complete banishment of religion from 
public life (Grigoriadis, 2007:22) by secularist policies after the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. The DPs role is also important because it was the first time in 
Turkey that the government was led by a party that was called Islamist. Moreover, the 




The DP certainly used religion as a political tool, for instance by allowing the 
call to prayer to be in Arabic instead of Turkish or by introducing religious courses in 
intermediate schools. Yet, while religion played an important role in the partys 
agenda, it was not by any means the only reason behind the partys success 
(Geyikdagi, 1984: 5). Some scholars claim that until the National Outlook Movement 
in 1967, there was not a real Islamist movement in Turkey. Instead, the reason for the 
DPs main success was the integration of marginalized social forces into the system 
(Turam, 2007: 44).  
 
The DP succeeded in more important policies such as improving 
communications and political participation led to increased levels of social 
interactions between formerly isolated rural areas, towns, and cities (Vertigans, 
2002: 50). As Geyikdagi (1984) says, after the Turkish republic was founded the RPP 
governments neglected the rural areas and gave more importance to industrial 
development than agricultural one. Moreover, the conflict between big businessmen, 
who were considered as secularists; and small business, and craftsmen, who were 
considered rural and religious, was another reason that the DP was supported by more 
religious and traditionalist people. This led conservative Anatolian (rural) people to 
become visible and more confident in political and social life. The introduction of 
multi-party democracy in 1946 provided politicians with an incentive to court the 
rural conservative vote. The first to do so was the DP of Adnan Menderes, prime 
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minister from 1950 to 1960 (Jenkins, 2003:48). As Mecham (2004:341) says, the 
centrist political parties of the late 1940s and 1950s sought to attract religiously 
conservative voters by incorporating Islamic language into their appeals. This 
strategy was initially used in the DPs challenge to the secular nationalist tradition of 
the RPP.  
 
The partys attitude towards religion was another significant reason that the 
DP was labeled as an Islamist party. However, what the DP did was to be more 
sensitive toward religious sentiments which meant getting rid of rigid policies against 
the religion and softening the debate between secularism and Islam. Indeed, when the 
Democrat Party was established under the leadership of Celal Bayar, President Ismet 
Inonu wanted the party to be sensitive on three points: preservation of the secular 
character of the state, foreign policy, and the campaign to spread primary education 
(Ozbudun, 2001:15). The establishment of the DP got support and a good reputation 
from Inonu and the RPP (Republican Peoples Party). This was not surprising 
because the administrative cadres of the DP came from RPP background and hence 
the Kemalist tradition. There was no huge ideological difference between the two 
parties, but they differed mostly in their attitudes toward the proper role of the state, 
bureaucracy, private enterprise, and local initiative, as well as toward peasant 
participation in politics (Ozbudun, 2001:30).  
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The rule of the Democrat Party in Turkey symbolizes an upward mobility. As 
Gulalp (2001) argues, the upward mobilization of poor and ignorant villagers who 
live in an uncultured manner, the thought that those people were still under the 
influence of tradition, and that they would live in big cities were ideas completely 
unacceptable for an urbanized and upwardly mobile individual. In other words, it was 
undesirable to say welcome to those immigrants who have non-modern tastes and 
pursue a traditional lifestyle, including the overt display of Islamic identity whether in 
clothing or in the public performance of religious rituals (Gulalp, 2001:389). 
Therefore, in Turkey, it might be said that the traditional-modern dichotomy has 
transformed into secular-Islamist and urban-rural. Also, in Turkey, to be a Muslim is 
evidently a social identity conferred upon the Turkish people by the secular state 
(Gulalp, 2001:394). In other words, the limits of being a Muslim in Turkey has been 
generated by the Turkish secular state, and the DP had freed the limits and made the 
religion free. As Turam (2007) emphasizes, the main success of the DP was the 
integration of excluded parts of society into the system. Besides the economic booms 
in the 1950s and 1960s, its tolerance toward religion was another reason of the DPs 
popularity. This can be called the first time attempt to bridge state and dissenting 
social forces (Turam, 2007:44). 
 
The Welfare Party (WP) 
The Welfare Party is the reflection of a political movement which has been called the 
National Outlook Movement (NOM). The NOM was formed in the 1970s in order 
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to inspire both spiritual and material development in Turkey. The movement 
addresses mainly socioeconomic problems by employing an Islamic language and by 
offering an Islamic morality as a panacea to them (Cinar and Duran, 2008:29). The 
NOM as an Islamic political movement, had a strong anti-Western/European stance 
by several political parties such as the National Order Party, the National Salvation 
Party, and the Welfare Party that represented the ideology of the NOM. For instance, 
in the name of Islamic universality rivaling that of the Western one, the WPs 
rhetoric sought to provincialize and particularize the claims of the West and thus of 
the Kemalist project in Turkey (Cizre (ed.), 2008:62). Overall, as one can derive 
from the aim of the movement, it had both national and religious connotations 
(Cizre (ed.), 2008:48). 
 
The movement, as Dagi (2005) notes, was the first political expression of 
political Islam under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, in the reconstruction 
process of Turkey after the 1960 military intervention. The National Outlook 
Movements first impression was the National Order Party that was founded in 1970 
by Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the NOM. The party was closed by military 
intervention in 1971. The second party was the National Salvation Party which was 
established in 1972 and later closed along with all other political parties following the 
1980 coup détat.  The third party of this lineage was the Welfare Party (1983-1996), 
which maintained this secular emphasis on the problems of daily life and decided to 
broaden its support base beyond the mosque mass. It was during the WP period that 
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political Islam became a major player in Turkish politics (Cinar and Duran, 
2008:29).  
 
In 1995, for the first time in the republican history of Turkey, an Islamist party 
came to power as a major force with 21 percent of the vote in the 1995 parliamentary 
elections. Once the WP agreed on the terms of a coalition government with the True 
Path Party, Necmettin Erbakan became the prime minister in 1995. The reason for the 
popularity and success of the WP can not be attributed just to the Islamic and 
conservative ideology of the party. Rather, it had to do with the fact that the Turkish 
electorate favored a relatively inexperienced and new political party for political 
office. Except for the WP, the parties seemed to be involved directly or indirectly in 
some form of corrupt dealing while in power. As Yavuz (1997) argues, the result of 
the 1995 elections were affected by services of local governments under the WP 
administration. The municipalities reduced corruption and nepotism in their 
municipalities (Yavuz, 1997:72). That gave power to the WP, being an 
uncorrupted party in Turkish politics.  
 
However, as the WP won the election, its political agenda had not been 
prepared to take an action for the countrys economic, political, and social problems 
(Dagi 2005). Moreover, the partys ideology and some of its specific actions 
provoked reactions from the secularist/Kemalist side. As a result of all these, on 
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February 28, 1997, the National Security Council7 (NSC) took a number of decisions 
to reinforce the secular character of the Turkish state threatened by the Islamists 
(Dagi, 2005:25). This date was later dubbed as a soft coup in Turkey, because after 
these decisions, the WP government had to step down in July 1997. After the 
intervention of the NSC (i.e. the military), the WP prime minister was forced to 
resign. 
 
In January 1998, the WP was closed by the Constitutional Court since 
allegedly it had become the center of anti-secularist activities. As Mecham (2004) 
argues, during the WP rule, the initial expansion of Islamic identity and symbolism in 
the public sphere, and some religious appointments in the Turkish bureaucracy 
changed Turkish politics surprisingly.   
 
The main agenda of the WP was built on the idea (and slogan) of Just 
Order8. The idea had huge importance in itself because it is a mixture of the free 
market capitalism of the West and the state controlled socialism of the former Eastern 
                                                
7 The NSC is set up as an advisory organ which gives advice about national security policies of the 
Turkish state. It has been created by the 1961 constitution and was made more powerful by the 1982 
constitution after the military coup in 1980. As Ayoob (2008:105) argues, the NSC is the primary 
instrument for militarys involvement in politics. It consists from Chief of General Staff, four main 
commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces, selected ministers, prime minister, and the president as a 
chair. As a result of the EU membership process, impact of the NSC has been reduced significantly. 
Although the NSC has limited authority since the EU reform process, the military is still a protector 
against security issues which include political Islam and Islamic reaction in Turkey.  
 
8 According to this interpretation, the West might have attained wealth and military power, but it 
suffered from acute moral and spiritual deficit which led to injustice in Western societies and thus to 
their eventual decline and fall. The just order aimed to lay the groundwork for a value-based social 
order dominated by the principles of Islamic law (Sharia) (Grigoriadis, 2007:23).   
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Block (Onis, 1997:54). The motto of Just Order also contains some religious 
aspects such as interest-free banking and a re-establishment of nationality against pro-
Western policies of the Turkish republic. Within the Just Order agenda, the WP 
condemned the West with its culture, economics, and politics which led to injustice, 
moral and spiritual degeneration, and materialism. According to WP, all of these 
negativities could be overcome with Islam and Islamic civilization, and Just Order 
was exactly what people needed. As Choudhury and Malik (1992:1) explain: 
 
The main objective of laws (also economic laws) in Sharia is to establish 
social justice through the process of managing and allocating physical and 
human resources in a way that harmonizes the objective goals of 
distributive equity and economic efficiency. The supremacy of the Godly 
Laws is maintained because of the Islamic claim of their serene perfection 
in the realm of social justice, which transcends the political vagaries of the 
laws legislated by human institutions.      
  
This is exactly what the WP argued with the just order agenda. They believe that the 
God-made laws were applicable for all times and people and it has a universal 
applicability.   
 
The WP experience showed that the Islamists had problems with power-
sharing when they came to power. Moreover, having the True Path Party as junior 
partner of secularist political actor in the coalition made the WP slow in its actions. 
As Cinar and Duran (2008:12) say, what the WP did disregarding the plural patterns 
of ideas, beliefs, and lifestyles in society by attributing an Islamic essence to them 
and by insisting that every nominal Muslim should practice Islam in the way that the 
WP defined. Turkey has seen Islamic reformation remain in power since 2002. 
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Turkish political Islam and politics are owing to the WP because it has learned greatly 
from the WP experience. This indeed will be the focus in the remaining pages of this 
chapter;  the emergence of the Justice and Development Party as a political 
organization and its ascendance to power in November 2002. 
 
The Justice and Development Party (JDP) 
In the process of the closure of the WP, within Welfare, two separate generations 
with divergent agendas began to emerge over the leadership issue (Mecham, 
2004:345). The younger reformist group demanded more democracy and a new party, 
while the traditionalists showed their loyalty to Erbakan. After the establishment of 
the Virtue Party (VP), the reformists started to fight for the leadership of the party. In 
May 2000, a group of reformists, led by Abdullah Gul, an economist educated in 
Britain, openly challenged the traditionalists for the leadership of the new party. In 
the elections for the party leadership, Gul lost by 521 votes to traditionalists 631 
(Jenkins, 2003:53). While the result in the party convention favored the 
traditionalists, the reformist group proved that it had the power to initiate change 
within the NOM. This was the beginning of a new era for the reformists themselves, 
but also for Turkish political Islam, and Turkey. 
 
The breakaway from the NOM had started in May 2000 in the VP congress. 
Cook (2007) describes the emergence of the JDP as a result of an historic split within 
Turkish politics, because it symbolized an implementation of a new ideology by a 
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new class of politicians, entrepreneurs, and activists. For some, it was not simply a 
race for leadership but rather an outbreak of differing views about the leadership, 
ideology and direction of the party (Dagi, 2005: 29). 
 
The breakaway party emerged under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
and was named Justice and Development Party on August 14, 2001. Just after two 
years from the declaration of the JDP, the party won a huge victory in the general 
elections on November 2002, receiving 34 percent of the votes. For the first time in 
15 years, a party won the majority of seats of the Turkish Parliament. What was the 
reason for the JDP victory? It was not about the religion of its members. As Mecham 
(2004:340) claims, the dissatisfaction with Turkish politics and concerns about the 
Turkish economy helped the JDP to get the victory.    
 
According to Dagi (2005:30), the 2002 election meant an end to political 
Islam in Turkey. This is because improving western style of democracy and liberal 
discourse has made the Islamists in Turkey weaker and has damaged their Islamic 
political identity in favor of democracy, human rights, and globalization. The JDP 
cadres realize that the ideology of 1990s (that of the WP) did not help anyone in 
Turkey; in contrast, the WP was banned from politics and the military intervened in 
politics. Therefore, the new party thought of religion in a social and individual basis. 
In other words, as Cinar and Duran (2008:21) argue, the reform process (of the JDP) 
has a more realistic and potentially more successful future through democratic 
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politics. By the JDPs reform policies, Islamism has passed into a post-Islamist 
stage in which Islamism is losing its political and revolutionary fervor but is steadily 
infiltrating social and cultural everyday practices (Cinar and Duran, 2008:21).     
 
On the other hand, as Mecham (2004:339) argues, the JDP emerged from a 
tradition of Islamically oriented political parties that have challenged the religious 
policies of the Turkish state. Previous Islamically tilting parties were banned from 
politics, and then re-emerged with a new name but with the same ideologies. The 
JDP, however, went a step further than its predecessors, dramatically highlighting a 
process of institutional change and ideological moderation that has occurred in 
Turkish political Islam. The JDP indeed had to go further since the time when the 
JDP established was the time to get unusual reforms of political Islam in Turkey 
(Grigoriadis, 2007:25).  
 
In one regard, these reforms are all related to internal politics and the EU 
accession process that makes it difficult to establish an Islamist state in Turkey. 
Moreover, the soft coup in 1997 and the closure of the WP were other reasons for 
the JDP to change dramatically. The JDP placed an emphasis on reducing the power 
of traditional centers of power, spearheaded by the military.  
 
The most significant and unusual characteristic of the JDP is its combination 
of Islam-friendly feature with a genuine-sounding democracy program (Cizre, 
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2008:1).The JDP has tried to engage the Turkish political system with the universal 
values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The JDP has adopted a 
moderate and non-religious discourse. The JDP realized that repudiating the WP 
legacy is not a solution for renewal; it has needed more than that. This realization has 
created a big transformation in Turkeys political system towards being more 
democratic and respectful to human rights and laws. Cizre (2008:5) defines the 
transformation process as an alteration of Islamists from collective activity to a 
Muslim subjectivity after the realization of the shrinkage of opportunity spaces for 
the Islamic actors after the WPs closure. The JDP has found out what Roy (2006) 
argues the Islamist ideology is not simply working. It is not the Islamists that are not 
working, however. It is the ideology that is not functioning. Because it did not 
provide the basis to create a new society, a new state, or offer an alternative to the 
two paths of western democracy and communism. Unlike the WP, the JDP has 
known that Islamization is not to be achieved through the state. The state is 
important only in opening new spaces for individuals and society as a whole by 
assuring basic rights and liberties. The state should not impose its ideology on 
society (Yildiz, 2008:46).  
 
The JDP describes itself as a conservative democrat9 party, and refuses any 
Islamist labeling. According to some scholars to be a conservative democrat can 
                                                
9 According to the JDP, conservative democrat means a gradualist approach to change; an 
understanding of politics as an art of compromise rather than conflict; recognition of the national will 
as the source of political legitimacy; a conception of the state as arbitrator; and support for pluralism 
and rule of law.  
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mean to be a Christian democrat10 of the West. As Grigoriadis (2007) says, according 
to such a perspective, religion is not excluded completely from politics, but it does 
not represent the main agenda of a party or as an alternative political way. Thus does 
not totally fit with the JDP idea, because the party does exclude religion from politics, 
but it emphasizes the importance of religion for an individual and a society.     
 
The JDP repeatedly declared that it is different from the other NOM parties 
although they were once members of the NOM. Instead, they argued that they have 
changed their image, discourse, and ideology. However, it does not mean that the JDP 
changed their religious identity. The JDP leadership cadre understood that using 
religion in politics did not bring about any political gains; instead it prevented 
progress of democracy in Turkey. Therefore, the JDP claim to be conservative 
democrat in their political agenda, not an Islamic one. In other words, they have been 
saying that the JDP is not the continuation of any party. In summary, as Grigoriadis 
(2007:22) aptly puts it, since the JDP joined government and the ideal of an Islamic 
state largely lost its appeal in Turkey, the party has abandoned its Islamist rhetoric 
and has taken to pursuing a pragmatic, moderate course in its core policies.   
 
Since 1950, the Turkish Republic has seen different types of political parties, 
all of which have been described as the face of political Islam in Turkey. From the 
                                                
10 Christian democracy is a political ideology that has dominated the politics of Western Europe for 
more than a century. Although they are secular, they are products of state-church conflicts. (see 
Kalyvas, 1996.) 
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DP to the JDP, Turkish politics witnessed different policies and policy 
implementations under different governments with different circumstances. As 
Sadowski (2006:219) argues, political Islam, like other varieties, takes very different 
forms at distinct places and times. Thus, in exactly the same manner, Turkish 
political Islam should be analyzed for different times, for different political parties 
and ideologies, and for different meanings. Therefore, the next chapter will be an 





My research question is: What are the changes in the Islamist spectrum in 
Turkish politics since the 1950s? Specifically, I expect to find differences among the 
following Turkish political parties which are the Democrat Party, the Welfare Party, 
and the Justice and Development Party, each of which was called Islamic/Islamist.  
 
In this research I study the uses and evolution of Islam in Turkish politics. As 
introduced in the preceding chapters, I will study three political parties in Turkey 
from a historical perspective. In order to depict the evolution of political Islam in 
Turkish politics, I compared the party programs and policy implications for the 
Democrat, Welfare, and Justice and Development Parties. Specifically, I studied the 
programs and policy implications for three different issue areas: foreign, education, 
and economic policies. However, my unit analysis was not only specific words, but 
also themes, meaning, and usages.  
 
I employed content analysis in this study. According to Manheim et.al (2006: 
169), content analysis is the systematic counting, assessing, and interpreting of the 
form and substance of communication. In other words, this method is used to assess 
written or textual information that political actors generate.  
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Today, the importance and effects of using symbols and giving messages 
through different messengers is significant. It is important to understand what 
political actors mean in order to say something about their intentions. As 
Krippendorff (2003:xviii) puts it, content analysts examine data, printed matter, 
images, or sounds-texts-in order to understand what they mean to people, what they 
enable or prevent, and what the information conveyed by them does. Therefore, 
content analysis is a method to examine the idea of message and the idea of the 
messenger.   
 
Since I will be dealing with the party programs of three political parties 
mentioned above, I chose the content analysis method in order to trace the various 
ways Turkish political parties used religion in their party agendas.  
 
In this respect, examinations of different communication types, such as web 
pages, transcripts of meetings or proceedings, government documents, political 
advertisements, speeches, programs or agendas, may provide us with an 
understanding of relations among political actors within political systems. Hence, 
content analysis can make it easier to analyze and understand political discourses of 
political actors.  
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In this research, the three allegedly Islamic political parties in Turkey that 
ocupied the government are the population of the study. The word is the unit of 
analysis, which is the particular element or characteristic of a given communication 
that we shall examine, count, or assess (Manheim et.al, 2006: 171). As such, I 
searched for the occurrences of words like Islam, Prophet Mohammed, and Muslim 
for specific references to religion in the party programs. In addition, I also sought 
references to such concepts as tradition, ethics, and customs. I reported references to 
these two separate sets of words separately in my discussion. While analyzing the 
term, in order to prevent biases, I interpreted the content of the programs in the 
context of the parties apparent purpose (Manheim et.al, 2006: 178). 
 
The party programs of Justice and Development Party are found on the partys 
web pages. For the Democrat and Welfare parties, because these documents are not 
accessible online, I obtained them from the library of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly.  
 
I analyzed party programs specifically for three issue areas: foreign 
policy/affairs, education issues, and economic policies. In addition, I attempted to 
display overt references to Islam and the ways these parties differed from each other 
in their uses of Islam regarding these issue areas. While doing this, my aim was to 
show the differentiations in political Islam in Turkish politics throughout the years by 
comparing the party programs.   
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Foreign policy/affairs: Theoretically, Islamists are devoted to a clear pan-
Islamist outlook and they support all Muslims (Fuller, 2003: 41). In other words, for 
an Islamist party, religion comes first in shaping relations with another country. In 
general, in the Muslim world, the supremacy of the Muslim ummah11 (community) 
(Moussalli, 1999:6) is one of the major determinants of foreign policy. Moreover, 
ummah with the ideology of tawhid12 are fundamental components of making policy 
in Islam. In addition, opposition to the West and Western ideologies is a common 
theme within political Islam. Because of the opposition to the Western world and its 
values, creation of an Islamic union against western countries and especially Israel, 
recreation of foreign policy with other Muslim countries, supporting Muslims in 
Palestine and Afghanistan could be examples of Islamization in foreign policy. 
Therefore, I expect that the ideology of both will be easily detectable in foreign 
policies of Islamic parties.  In these cases I expect that the Welfare Party is the only 
one which supported religious ideology in foreign policy. Thus, I expect that WP will 
openly state religious affiliation as a defining feature of its foreign policy orientation.  
 
                                                
11 This concept lies a proper realization of many phenomena of the Muslim world. The believers are 
members of the Ummah, bound together in community by ties, not of kinship or race, but of religion: 
the acknowledgment of one God and the apostolic mission of his Prophet Mohammad (Hassan, 1981, 
83). 
 
12 Tawhid is the worldview of Islam. It is, as fundamental component of Islam, not only a religious 
principle; more important, it requires eliminating independent earthly human systems opposed to 
hakimiyya (sovereignty of God) and human transformation (Moussalli, 1999:27).      
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Education policies: In Islam, education helps in the complete growth of an 
individuals personality whereas instruction merely trains an individual or a group to 
do some task efficiently (Al-Attas, 1977: ix). This means that in Islamic thought 
education serves to reconstruct the whole society, preserve culture and religion, and 
prevent degeneration of culture and religion. According to Islamic education, the 
Western style and secularist education causes corruption in society and personal 
development. Another characteristic of Islamic education is, as Ba-Yunus (1981:86) 
argues, Islamic education should aim at creating voluntary attitudes among the 
learners to develop a certain society which is purified from sin, injustice, 
materialism. Instead, it should be full with recognition, acknowledgement, and 
perfection.   
 
As Halstead (2004:520) argues, basically there are three sources of Islamic 
education. The first one is the Quran that says pursuit of knowledge is a religious 
duty. Secondly, it is the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad which provides further 
insight into Islamic education. The last one is writings by Islamic philosophers in the 
high period of Islamic civilization about educational issues in general. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, Islamic education has three important aims that are different from 
the Western type of education. According to Halstead, development of individual 
potential from childhood to adulthood which means in Arabic tarbiya is the first step. 
The second one to be achieved is the process of character development and learning 
moral and social behavior and to be responsible within the community and society 
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which is tadip. The third one is talim which is imparting and receiving knowledge 
through training, instruction or other forms of education. Additionally, these three 
steps have their own places in Islamic education as El-Tom argues (Khan (ed.), 
1981:34, 35, 36). The family is the source of tarbiya, tadip comes with the mosque, 
and finally the school is the starting place of talim. 
 
Islamic education should not contain secularist items in it. In the purist form 
of Islamic education there is no aspect that would be identified with secularism. As 
Halstead argues (2004:521), modern Western knowledge is infused with western 
secular values and is inappropriate for Muslims because of its secular associations. It 
is because, as Al-Attas (1977) emphasizes, the secularist ideology can not overlap 
with Islam; and some Muslim countries open their educational systems to secularism 
and they spiritually lost their identities.  Islamists are favor of Sharia rules or 
Islamization of the education system, although it is not easy in countries which have 
strict secular rules in education, such as in Turkey.  
 
In that respect, I expect to find direct references to Koranic schools, reforms 
in the education system as hiring teachers with specific religious backgrounds, 
opening mosques, new religious schools, and divinity colleges. Also, since family 
education is one of the most essential and important parts of educational system for 
children, encouraging young people to be married in order to protect family would be 
another form of supporting traditional and religious education.  
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Economic policies: The guiding principles of economic policies in Islam are 
the Islamic laws (Sharia). Although the degree of following the Islamic teachings in 
economy varies, and there is no Muslim society, at present, which can be called as 
Islamic economy (Metwally, 1997:941), there are many important economic 
principles in Islamic teachings. As Choudhury and Malik (1992:1) put, the main 
objective of these laws is to establish social justice. According to them, distributive 
equity and economic efficiency are crucial to achieve social justice in society. 
Moreover, according to Islamic principles, people can not claim an absolute 
ownership, because the God is the ultimate owner of everything. This is the idea that 
the gifts of God which have been delivered as a trust into the hands of the human 
being to produce the maximum output and to fulfill Gods plan of establishing 
prosperity on earth (Metwally, 1997:942). Moreover, profit sharing under economic 
cooperation, abolition of interest, payment of wealth tax, and abolition of waste in 
consumption and production (Choudury, 1992:26) are the basic principles and goals 
of Islamic economy.   
 
Although Islamist parties do not support state intervention in the markets, 
some (if not all) seek changes in free market economies. Specifically, some Islamist 
parties are against the use of interest, and they expect more social services from the 
state. In addition to these, according to Islamic economic principles, there is a 
collective participation of individuals, rather than individuals as an actor by 
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themselves. This is because private ownership, although Islam recognizes it, should 
be secondary and a subsidiary to that of the community as a whole (Metwally, 1997: 
942). Here I will trace any economic policies of the political parties (as they are 
explained in the party programs) that are consistent with economic principles of 
Islam.  
I found these policies in the Welfare Party, but not in the party programs of 
the Democratic Party and the Justice and Development Party. Therefore, I also looked 
at actual policies and writings of scholars about the DP and the JDP. I categorized the 
parties according to Daniel Brumbers classification which are explained in Chapter 
1. In that chapter, there are other widely used categorizations which are 
fundamentalist vs. reformist and Islamist vs. Islamic. But, I did not use this category 
to explain the parties positions because of their lack of depth. 
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COMPARING TURKISH POLITICAL ISLAMS 
 
In this chapter, I will look at the party programs and policies beginning with 
the Democrat Party, then the Welfare Party and lastly the Justice and Development 
Party. Then I categorize these parties in accordance with Brumbergs (Kramer (ed.), 
1997: 16-18) classification of political Islam; specifically I study the foreign, 
education, and economical policies of the Democrat Party, Welfare Party, and Justice 
and Development Party.  
 
These three parties can be considered as part of a long transformational 
process in Turkish politics. This process can be traced back to the 1950s and the DPs 
emergence and its accession to power. In the context of WPs emergence, Narli 
(1999:1) describes this process as a confrontation between provincial/traditional and 
urban/modern cultures, new social classes, and the fragmentation of the conservative 
electorate. The peak point of this confrontation was with the WP government, which 
is called the first Islamist government of Turkey, under the leadership of Necmettin 
Erbakan. However, according to Nasr (2005), since the early 1990s the process that 
has been experienced in Turkey under the name of political Islam, is non-Islamist but 
Islamic-oriented. 
 
It may be tempting to label all center-right parties in Turkey as Islamist, 
because as Cizre and Cinar (2003) argue these parties have all got their popular 
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support from genuinely devout Muslims. However, in the election of 2007, the JDP 
got 47 percent of the vote from different social and economical classes as a center-
right party does. In Turkey the center-right parties oppose both politicized Islam and 
radicalized secularism. As such, it is argued that Turkish center-right parties have 
been trying to integrate of Muslim values and moderate Islamic politics into broader 
right-of-center platforms that goes beyond exclusively religious concerns (Nasr, 
2005:14). Since the 1950s, this process ultimately/ gradually changed the political 
landscape. According to Yavuz (1997:73), Islam has not become the language of 
modern Turkish politics, Turkeys political language has been Islamicized by 
different political actors and the military.  
 
The years that the WP was in the government and was finally closed down by 
the constitutional court is usually referred to as the February 28 Process13. The 
February 28 Process is a major turning point in Turkish political life and in the 
progression of political Islam in Turkey. During and after the February 28 Process, 
Islamists realized that to re-built a state and society with Sharia rules was impossible 
in Turkey. According to Dagi (2008), Islamists then accepted the failure of the idea of 
an Islamic state. Moreover, this marked the beginning of a re-adaptation process of 
religion in Turkish politics.  
 
                                                
13 The February 28 Process was an attempt and reaction of the Turkish military on 28 February 1997 in 
order to restore the Kemalist and secular aspects of Turkey which were thought to be damaged by the 
Welfare Party. In other words, as Cizre (Cizre (ed.), 2008:164) argues, it describes the militarys plan 
to refashion Turkeys political landscape along Republican secular lines without actually having to 
take power directly. 
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After the split in the Virtue Party, which was the successor of the WP, the 
dissidents declared a new party. The JDP has confirmed that ideologically it has 
changed and it is not pursuing and will not pursue the ideology and policies of the 
traditional National Outlook Movement. It is noteworthy that this split from the VP 
happened after February 28. This was a significant development in that February 28 
has profoundly altered the formulation of public policy and the relation between 
state and society (Cizre&Cinar, 2003:310). The February 28 Process has been a very 
important date to understand political Islam in Turkey.  
 
In the February 28 Process, Turkish Armed Forces was the main actor. Cinar 
(Cizre (ed.), 2008:110) argues that the process was initiated by the Turkish military in 
order to secure secularist Turkey and the military held the whole political class and 
even ordinary citizens responsible for the growth of Islamist reactionism. Therefore, 
the role of the military in the evolution of political Islam in Turkey should be 
emphasized. Although the militarys role can be seen as a step back from democracy, 
in the Turkish experience, as Nasr (2005:17) argues, the militarys involvement limits 
the Islamistss room to maneuver and it makes Islamist parties shift to new political 
formulas such as coalition governments with secular parties in order to get 
legitimacy.  
 
During the 1990s, the WP failed to make policies with reference to religious 
issues, underestimated the importance of communicating with other parts of the 
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society rather than conservative people, and undermine to get broader support from 
different ideologies. In this respect, the militarys reaction on February 28 can be 
considered within this context. On the other hand, the emergence of the JDP and its 
consolidation of power represented a much different approach.     
 
As a result of this study and analysis, I find the Welfare Party as a tactical 
modernist which selects use of modernist themes in order to create an Islamist state, 
and the Justice and Development Party as a strategic modernist which has a liberal 
democratic vision without any intention to create an Islamist state. However, I do not 
expect to put the Democrat Party in any of the four categories of Brumberg because 
generally the DP should not be called as an Islamist and/or Islamic party. But, 
because of some outsiders that have called the Democrat Party as an Islamist, the 
partys ideology should be examined in terms of political Islam. 
 
The Democrat Party 
 
The policies of building a new Turkish nation and the rigid interpretation of 
secularism in the Ataturks Republic did not necessarily take into account that Turks 
are religious beings and that Islamic mores are the building blocks of their personal 
evolution and everyday life (Khan (ed.), 2007:124). This however changed 
significantly as a result of the multi-party experience in Turkey. Religiously oriented 
people found a legitimate way to express their political views and ideologies (Yildiz, 
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2008). Specifically, as the Republican Peoples Party was faced with competition and 
new parties emerged in the 1940s, religious groups were able to openly or secretly 
associate themselves with these new parties that tried to get rid of strict regulations on 
the religion (Narli, 1999:1). 
 
  Before the establishment of the DP, there were discussions about how the new 
political party would be. As Erogul (Schick&Tonak (eds.), 1987:104) says, the only 
legitimate opposition party should have been a semi-liberal rightist one with ideology 
no different from the RPP. It would be called loyal opposition because it was 
established after detailed research. The agreement on an opposition party took 18 
months of debate within the RPP (Cook, 2007:97). In terms of religion and secular 
ideology, according to Geyikdagi (1984:75), the difference in religious policy 
formulation between the RPP and the DP was relative rather than absolute. There did 
not seem to be much difference between them. It was the implementation of the 
policy, rather than its formulation, which made the difference. As a result of all 
debates and agreement to create a new party, modern Turkish history from 1950 on 
has demonstrated a gradual process of redressing Kemalist ideological excesses and 
returning to a more comfortable and normal relations with Turkish culture and 
historical past (Fuller, 2008:17).  
 
The foreign policy of the DP administration would rely on the traditional 
alliances with Western countries, primarily with France, Great Britain and the USA. 
 60
However, the DP government, as Erogul (Schick&Tonak (eds.), 1987:109) argues, 
took this policy to its logical extreme by sending 4.500 Turkish troops to the 
Korean War in alliance with the US. This was ultimately rewarded by Turkeys 
membership to NATO in 1952. Similar policies friendly to the West were pursued 
during the DP government. For instance, the DP government took a side on 
Yugoslavias support against Russia in accordance with the US. During the DP 
government, Turkey also continued its pro-Western foreign policies in the Middle 
East while signing the Baghdad Pact against the Soviet Union.  
 
For Geyikdagi (1984) there is not much difference between the DP and the 
RPP in terms of domestic and international policies. According to Fuller (2008), the 
foreign policy of Turkey in the 1950s and the 1960s was very Westernized and 
limited in the Middle East. For Fuller (2008:34), from 1957 to 1967, during the 
period of Turkeys first democratically elected government under Adnan Menderes, 
Turkeys foreign policy was almost completely aligned with Western interests. 
Others argued that the foreign policy of the DP was a strategic choice in order to 
protect Turkey from the Soviet threat during the Cold War. This relationship between 
the West and Turkey was thus shaped by the realities of the Cold War. Hence, Turkey 
was reclassified in Washington as part of Europe (Fuller, 2008:33).  Likewise, this 
relationship necessitated that the DP government, in order to get support of the US for 
its political and economical requests, cooperates with Israel (Bishku, 2006:181).      
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Distinct from the RPP, the economic policies of the DP would be more liberal 
instead of than strict and statist. The DP governments lowered interest rates and 
encouraged foreign investment. Moreover, the state monopoly on certain goods was 
be removed. Overall, the DPs economic promise was to make Turkey a little 
America (Timur, 1987:21).  The governments plan was to use Western aid and 
credit in order to achieve that promise.  
 
Keyder (Schick&Tonak (eds.), 1987:39) argues that, the DP promised to 
curtail state intervention in the economy, transfer state-owned enterprises to the 
private sector, and ensure full recompense for the peasants toil. As Keyder adds, the 
economic policies of the DP were the result of two basic complaints of the society: 
one of them is religious freedom, and the other one is oppressive control of state over 
economy. Almost all policies of the DP were shaped by these two essential 
complaints. However, without any overall economic plan, the economic policies of 
the DP collapsed because of the high inflation rate and a foreign currency bottleneck 
resulting in goods shortages (Aksin, 2007:255). 
 
 Before the DP took the power, there were already signs of a religious revival 
in Turkey. The RPP was aware of this revival as well; indeed, in order to gain the 
peoples support, RPP governments made concessions to religious groups during the 
1940s. By the mid 1940s, the number of religious magazines were increasing and 
many mosques were being built. One of the first actions of Ataturks successor Ismet 
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Inonu was the publication of the Encyclopedia of Islam in Turkish. The controversial 
Imam-Hatip14 schools were introduced at this time by the RPP governments. 
 
Before coming to power in 1950, the DP party program stated in Article 14 
that, the party rejected the erroneous interpretation of secularism that lead to a 
hostile attitude against religion, and advocated a clearer separation between religion 
and public affairs so that government would not interfere in religious activities 
(Geyikdagi, 1984:69). Yet, once in power, the DP too made concessions to the 
religious sentiments of the Turkish people. Examples abound; the call to prayer in 
Arabic instead of Turkish; the broadcast of Koran recitations on the radio during 
Ramadan for 10 minutes; introducing compulsory religious courses in intermediary 
schools and the reopening of an Institute of Islamic Studies. While the conventional 
thinking is that these were products of the DP governments, the role of the RPP 
should be noted for an accurate evaluation of this process that goes back to the late 
1940s. Moreover, all these policies should be considered under the specific social and 
economical situation which occured just after the long single party government with 
strict secular ideology.   
 
In order to understand the DP era and the religious revival in Turkey, I argue 
that the social context should be emphasized. Whereas one can not ignore the DPs 
role in this process, such developments as urbanization and economic liberalization 
                                                
14 Literally Imam-Hatips are Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools. Howard A.Reed, 1955. Turkeys 
New Imam-Hatip Schools. Die Welt des Islam, New Series, Vol. 4, Issue 2/3, pp. 150-163. 
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must be placed in context as well. As Vertigans (2003:50) says, at this time 
improved communications and political participation led to increased levels of social 
interactions between formerly isolated rural areas, towns, and cities. Moreover, in 
the city, where life-styles are more fluid, where tradition is not part of everyday life 
as in the village, Muslims begin to wear Islam as a badge and become dependent 
upon religion for a definition of their identity (Mardin, 1989:179). 
 
As Geyikdayi argues (1984:78), it is a well-accepted fact that the DP 
governments directly or indirectly encouraged private initiatives favoring religion 
such as the building of mosques and the setting up of centers of religious instruction 
by private funds or communal donations. Moreover, it is a social fact that after the 
DP administration, the appearance of religion in public spaces increased. The same 
argument can be made later for the WP and the JDP; however, it should not mean that 
this represents political Islam. On the contrary it is one of sociological improvement 
and urbanization process. It was in this context of change that religion became more 
visible in public life. This gave way to opposition groups blaming the DP for using 
religion as a tool in politics. As Karpat (1972:355) argues that, as a result of passing 
political power to rural people, the upper economic and landed families, which had 
joined the Republican Party during its one-party rule and benefited from its statist 
policies, began to accuse the rising groups of corruption, political opportunism, and 
naturally, religious reaction.   
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The Welfare Party 
After the 1980 coup, Turkey entered a new political era with a new constitution. The 
introduction of a new constitution also had ramifications for the role of religion in 
Turkish political and public lives. Indeed, religion was used as a glue by the leaders 
of the coup employed an ideology known as Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was 
constructed by a group of conservative in order to abolish ideological polarization 
and strife-ridden communal violence in Turkey (Yavuz, 1997:67). In that 
environment, political Islam in Turkey and the WP (re)emerged as a consequence of 
this Turkish Islam. WPs accession to power after the 1995 parliamentary elections 
took place in this environment. After the 1995 election, the WP formed a coalition 
government with the True Path Party in July 1996 which lasted a year. With the WP 
in government, Turkish politics was faced with a different ideology than the state 
ideology. The ideology of the WP was in stark contrast to the Turkish political 
establishment where the whole legal system is geared to secularism (Aksin, 
2007:303).  
 
The WPs and its leaders ideology were closer to the Islamist ideology than 
the state ideology of Turkey. As Fuller (2008:41) argues, Erbakans rhetorical calls 
reflected many of the classical themes of the main-stream Islamists in other parts of 
the world. Indeed, for Yavuz (1997:65) the party of Necmettin Erbakan is not only 
a party but also a larger Islamic social movement that seeks to reconstruct many 
traditional aspects of society from cuisine to political exchange. 
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The WP continued the ideology of the National Order Party and the National 
Salvation Party although it was not as powerful as those. The party opposed the 
imperial character of the West, Turkeys accession process to the EU, and the 
membership of Turkey in NATO which created the state of Israel (Bishku, 
2006:179). Criticizing relations with Israel and its regional politics and supporting 
Palestine against Israel were the main foreign policies of the WP. However, as Bishku 
(2006:190) argues while Erbakan had campaigned on a platform to cut ties with 
Israel, as prime minister he proved both unable and unwilling to do anything about 
it. This was mainly due to the fact that the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Minister and more importantly the National Security Council continued Turkeys 
traditionally Western oriented foreign policies. Moreover, Erbakan demonstrated a 
deep suspicion of US strategic intentions toward Turkey and consistently urged 
greater Turkish independence of action in foreign policies (Fuller, 2008:42). In the 
election manifesto of the WP (1991:56), it was clearly indicated that the previous 
Turkish governments were all affected and controlled by Western countries and 
especially by the US.   
 
Prime Minister Erbakan made his first official visits not to Europe or the US 
but to Iran and Libya. While in office, Erbakan also wished to re-build relations with 
Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The motivation behind these visits 
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was to establish a Developing 8 (D-8) organization, a pointedly Muslim parallel to 
the Group of Seven (G-7) of the West (Fuller, 2008:43). 
 
In general, the WPs foreign policy was primarily based on religion and 
Islamic nationalism, ummah. For instance, in one of his speech in Istanbul during the 
1995 election campaign, Erbakan promised that he would liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan, 
Chechnya, and Jerusalem (New York Times, 30 June 1996). Creation of an Islamic 
United Nations, an Islamic common market, custom agreements with other Muslim 
countries rather than the European countries (The WP election manifesto: p. 166) 
chaired by Turkey and D-8 countries were all illustrations of such an approach to 
foreign policy. For the WP, the EU was a Christian club and hence the party was 
against any relationship with the EU.  
  
Besides the foreign policy issue, the WP and Erbakan were criticized for some 
specific actions. As Onis (2001:286) argues the WPs most criticized actions were in 
the cultural realm, such as plans to build a mosque in Taksim Square in Istanbul and 
changing work hours for government employees during the Islamic month of 
Ramadan. One of the most troubling acts of Erbakan was his Ramadan dinner with 
leaders of various religious sects at the Prime Ministers residence.  
 
According to the WP policies, to be Western and to be modern are totally 
different. Instead of becoming Western, Erbakan hoped for a great Turkey that 
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would return to its Islamic cultural and moral roots (Bishku, 2006:179). According 
to this logic, by keeping Turkish-Islamic identity, Turkey could be modern in terms 
of technology and industry.  This kind of ideology is not rare in political parties that 
have powerful Islamist ideology in their political agendas, like the WP, and they 
claim to represent the national view and criticize Westernization as a betrayal of 
traditional, national, and spiritual values (Dagi, 2008:26). 
 
The well-publicized Just Order was at the center of the WPs economic 
policy. While the WP did not oppose the principles of liberal economy, the party 
aimed for what it called a genuine capitalist system with social justice, and the 
rhetoric of self-sufficiency (Cook, 2007:109); but its economic plan was state-centric. 
With the idea of Gods ownership of everything, the WPs goal was to recreate 
economic equality. Although the leaders of the party were in favor of some 
application of Islamic economic principles such as an interest-free financial system, it 
would be difficult to implement all of the Islamic principles (Metwally, 1997:957). 
The WP was against the capitalist system and its institutions such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the Common Market. In an attempt to 
disassociate Turkey from the Western economies, Erbakan also wanted to establish 
economic ties with Islamic countries. As much as this was a foreign policy for 
Erbakan, it was also an economic issue. For instance, during the WP government, 
Erbakan signed a $23 billion agreement with Iran, which supplied Iranian natural gas 
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to Turkey for 23 years. Also, Erbakan wished to create an Islamic development bank 
and Islamic currency to be used in trade between Muslim countries.   
 
The education policy of the WP was also based on just order. According to 
the party program, the WP attached more importance to moral and spiritual education 
and development. Thus, for the party, moral and spiritual development of human 
beings is the central feature of school education. Therefore, the WP promised in its 
program (p. 99, 100), to open Quran courses, Imam Hatip schools, religious and 
divinity faculties in universities, and mosques.    
 
The Justice and Development Party 
One of the realities about the JDP is that the party did not emerge out of the blue. The 
main cadres of the JDP grew mainly from movements and parties that were called 
Islamist. The significance of the JDP is that it was the first party to break free of 
the more traditional Islamist influence of Necmettin Erbakan, who led four successive 
Islamist parties from 1970 to 1997 (Fuller, 2008:49). The JDP has been successful 
by learning to be democratic, professional and moderate unlike the earlier Islamist 
parties.  
 
As Dagi (2008:25) emphasizes that the JDP is an Islamic entity. The party 
ideology grew into the first political representative of Islamism in Turkish politics, 
known as NOM. However, when we look at the JDPs public statements, social 
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base program, and behavior over more than five years as Turkeys ruling party, the 
JDP appears to be not an outright Islamist movement, but rather a conservative one 
within the tradition of Turkish center-right politics (Dagi, 2008:26).  
 
In July 2001, there was a division in the NOM for the first time in its history. 
The split of the JDP from the NOM and specifically from the Virtue Party was not 
only political, but also and more importantly, ideological (Cizre, 2003; Dagi, 2008). 
The split, the dissidents of the VP who later established the JDP indicated that 
ideologically the two parties were totally different and the new party was formed to 
represent the center-right in Turkish politics, similar to the DP and the Motherland 
Party.  
 
One of the differences between the JDP and the NOM is in the vision of 
religion in political and social life. In the JDPs agenda, Islam in Turkey operates as 
a source of social stability as a motivational force rather than as a radical political 
project (Yavuz&Esposito (ed.), 2003:12). As such, with the JDP the idea of social 
rather than political Islam gained ground. The partys leader remains individually 
committed to Islam as a religion, but refrain from developing an Islamist agenda 
(Dagi, 2008:27, 29).  
 
The JDPs Middle East policy has been notable because from the founding of 
the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, its relations with the former Muslim regions of 
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the Ottoman Empire have been limited and strained (Fuller, 2008:4). With its 
accession to power, JDP made significant changes to Turkish foreign policy in the 
Middle East. Since the Middle East is a region that faces chaos at various times, and 
given its proximity to Turkey, JDP government has played an active role in the 
region. Indeed, as Fuller (2008:5) argues, Turkey, for the first time in its Republican 
period, is becoming a major player in Middle East Politics. Although the foreign 
policy of the JDP towards the Middle East might be seemed as an example of Islamist 
agenda, it will be the first time because there is a sharp policy change in Turkish 
foreign affairs after the long Kemalist- oriented foreign relations that have made 
people biased about the Middle East. However, the foreign policy toward the Middle 
East might still be thought of and qualified as an expression of the Islamic agenda.  
 
Since 2002, the JDP governments have changed many elements of in Turkish 
foreign policy. Renewed efforts to initiate EU reforms and a new formulation of 
Turkeys Cyprus policy are two major examples of these changes. According to 
Fuller (2008), what the JDP government has been doing since 2002 is trying to 
harmonize Kemalism, as an inevitable feature of the Turkish Republic, and the 
Westernization process of Turkey with the Turkish culture with its Islamic norms and 
values.  
 
Since 1963, the EU membership has been one of the most important targets 
for Turkey. Under the administration of the JDP, Turkeys EU reforms have been 
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accelerated. According to Dagi (2008:28), for the AKP in particular, the language of 
human rights and democracy and the goal of EU membership opened up the 
possibility of building a liberal-democratic coalition with modern and secular sectors 
at home and abroad. Cohen (Khan (ed.), 2007:18) says that as Turkey is integrated 
into the EU, there will gradually emerge clear distinctions between the mosque and 
the state like those between the church and the state in Western democracies. As such, 
in a way, the EU membership process limits Islamic legislation and religious 
expression in state policies which in turn makes Turkey more secular and democratic 
(Nasr, 2005).  
 
Turkeys Cyprus policy since the JDP assumed power in November 2002 also 
has undergone significant changes. According to Dagi (2008:28) the JDPs 
willingness to work with the UN on solving the Cyprus question despite the 
resistance of Turkeys state bureaucracy was a totally different foreign policy than 
previous ones. In contrast to the policies pursued by the JDP, previous Turkish 
foreign policy in Cyprus was based on strict nationalist principles. In its program, the 
JDP promises to follow a proactive diplomacy on the Cyprus issue. This has been the 
case with the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus and then with the 
JDP governments active promotion of the Annan Plan.   
 
The economic policy of the JDP has also important differences with Islamist 
parties. As Dagi emphasizes (2008), policies of engagement with the global markets 
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and the global economy, pursuing the relations with the IMF, a successful 
privatization program, the encouragement of foreign investment in Turkey, and more 
involvement in the global economy indicate that the JDP is not on the path of 
Islamization, but globalization. One of the main economic policies of the JDP is the 
withdrawal of the state from commodity and service markets. Overall these show that 
the economic policy of the party is close to liberal economic principles, which 
suggest fewer roles for the state in the economy and integration with the global 
economy. 
 
Dagi (2008:30) says looking at the AKPs platform, its public discourse, its 
social base, and all its record in government, one does not see an Islamist faction, but 
rather a globalist, market-oriented, pro-Western, and populist political party.  
What the JDP is trying to do is to transform the unsecular tendencies of Muslim 
Democracy into long-term commitment to democratic values (Nasr, 2005:15) like 
those held in Europe. However, according to Tibi (2008:46), the AKP is an Islamist 
party, and not an Islamic conservative party. The AKP is intolerant, not only towards 
secularists, but also toward ethnic and religious minorities as the Kurds and the 
Alevis. Like Tibi, Fuller (2008:52, 53) classifies the JDP as one form of an Islamist 
party. Yet in one of his earlier studies, Fuller (2005) argues that the JDP can not be 
considered as an Islamist party because all it wants is freedom and rights. Hence, 
there is not a consensus or even consistency on this matter.  
  
 73
 The education policy of the JDP is secular and gives easy access to religious 
education within the secular limits of the state. In terms of education, the party 
program says that, except for required religious education in elementary and 
intermediate levels, , students can take religious courses as elective courses with 
permission of their guardians. With this policy, they have opened up religious 
education a little bit more. Moreover, the Ministry of Education under the JDP 
administration has started a campaign that aims to increase number of girls, who are 
educated especially those who live in South and South East regions of Turkey. In this 
case, the JDPs encouragement of girls education has modern and secular ideology 
rather than Islamist idelogy.       
  
However, the JDP might behave more religiously in order to protect the 
family structure both in the religion and Turkish culture. In 2004, the party tried to 
introduce adultery as a crime in the new Turkish Penalty Code. But, after harsh 




Owing to its secular foundations, the differences of the Turkish case from that of 
other Islamic countries creates a new form of political Islam which is called Turkish 
Islam which tries to push Islamic influences on governance away and put religion in 
the private sphere. The process is not over yet; Turkish politics has been 
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experimenting to find new and workable ways to live with democracy, Kemalism, 
secularism, and the religion as a personal belief and code of action (Fuller, 
2008:55). 
 
When we look at the WP, the result is different from the JDP and DP since the 
overall goals were externalization of Islamic identity in the public domain and the 
construction of a moral and virtuous community (Yavuz, 1997:80). In contrast, in 
terms of religion, the main goal of both the DP and JDP, which are considered as 
center-right parties (Mert, 2007), is free religious activities within the limits of 
democracy and secular ideology.    
 
According to Nasr (2005:18) the success of the AKPs Muslim Democratic 
platform is less a triumph of religious piety over Kemalist secularism than of an 
independent bourgeoisie over a centralizing state. We can generalize this for the DP 
government and the WP government as well. However, as Yavuz argues (1997), the 
success of the WP was the product of post-1980 political and economic settings that 
were created by the military and state. 
 
According to Yavuz (Khan (ed.), 2007:126), the JDP can not be labeled as an 
Islamist party and it is not an Islamic party any more, because the JDP does not seek 
legitimacy on Islamic ground. In Turkey the understanding of politics and governing 
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has changed. In other words, in Turkey, there is the process of post-Islamism or the 
shift from the politics of identity to the politics of services.  
 
According to Fuller (2008:52), the JDP is a moderate Islamist party because it 
tries to remove an explicitly religious agenda from its political program but does not 
remove the inherent values of Islam for it. Likewise, Introvigne (Yavuz (ed.), 
2006:41) says, the JDP, although it has an expression of political Islam, can be 
considered a religious party that rejects the brotherhood model. Instead it takes the 
new title of conservative democrat for itself.   
 
The answer to the question of whether the JDP is an Islamist party or not 
came from the EU on October 2005 with its decision to begin the accession talks with 
Turkey. As Dagi (2008) argues, this was in essence an approval of the 
democratization and Europeanization of JDPs policies. In other words, the EU policy 
pursued by the JDP has been a clear proof of the identity of the JDP as a political 
party not to be an Islamist.  
 
As Yildiz (Cizre (ed.), 2008:48) argues, in contrast with Erbakan and NOM 
ideology, the JDP has adopted a posture of compromise, used a secular political 
jargon, accepted religious visibility only in individual and social realms, highlighted 
its non-Islamism, and declared the headscarf an issue of minor importance.  
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The education policies of the JDP and the WP have significant differences. 
For instance, in the WP program, the party promises to open Quran courses in every 
village, to open Prayer Leader and Preacher School in every town, and Divinity 
Schools in every city. On the other hand, the JDP promises easy access to religious 
education such as allowing parents some discretion in their choice of primary and 
secondary schools, securing equality of opportunity for the graduates of religious 
schools in the highly competitive university entrance examination (Yildiz, 2008). 
Moreover, the Ministry of Education under the JDP government has started a 
campaign which has aimed to increase number of girl students especially in East and 
South East region of Turkey. In this regard, the JDP has given different meanings to 
education than the WP. Likewise, the DP education policy differs from the WPs but 
comes closer to the JDP approach that aims to increase easy access to religious 
education without exploitation of religion. 
 
Furthermore, nationality has big impact on the WPs foreign, education, and 
economic policies. The party, in its program, calls nationality as an essence and 
combines it with religion. In the program of the WP, nationality is combined with 
religion, ethnicity, and regionalism and the Ottoman-Islamic past although it paid lip 
service to Ataturk nationalism (Yildiz, 2008: 54). That kind of combination might be 
done not to emphasize religion too much and to get different types of peoples 
attention. In terms of nationality, the DP and the JDP differ from the WP. However, 
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the DP and the JDP have preferred to use nationalism in citizenship, civic and 
territorial elements of consciousness, as Yildiz (2008) says.  
 
 As a result of all these comparisons, the WP can be categorized as tactical 
modernist in terms of using modernist themes to advance a fundamentalist agenda 
and change. The DP, I argue that, can not be categorized as an Islamist party, because 
its cadre and leadership came out from the RPPs secular ideology. Also, the social 
and economic conditions of Turkey when the DP came to power have many impacts 
on the policies of the party. However, if the practical implications of DP policies are 
considered, one can argue that the DP can be tagged as strategic modernist. Lastly, 
the JDP, although some scholars such as Mert (2007) call it center-right party with its 
policies in the government, might be tagged as strategic modernist because their aim 
is a transformation towards democracy in a secular environment.  
  
In conclusion, I ended up classifying the three parties, using all the evidence 
as follows; 
1) The Democratic Partys agenda did not have anything to do with 
political Islam. Moreover, in the Turkish politics, the DP generally 
fits into a center-right party position. However, if the policy 
implications are used to decide the categorization, the DP can be 
called as a strategic modernist.   
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2) The Welfare Party was the most radical of the three in both 
religion and policy. Although the party gained power with policies 
that made religion more visible in state and public after the 1980 
coup, the party can be tagged as a tactical modernist in terms of 
using modernist themes to advance its agenda. 
3) The Justice and Development Party, in spite of Islamic features of 
its leadership cadres, can be a model for strategic modernism. This 
is demonstrated by the partys liberal and democratic vision of 
transforming Turkey into a democratic government by using a 




This study started with a goal to explain the evolution of process of political 
Islam in Turkish politics. In order to understand different stages of political Islam in 
Turkey, I chose three Turkish parties which are the Democrat Party (DP), the Welfare 
Party (WP), and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and looked at their party 
programs and policy implications in terms of political Islam. In the first chapter, the 
definition of political Islam in general is explained. Although there are common 
features of political Islam in different countries, there should be noted that every 
countrys version has its unique characteristics. Even in a country, political Islam and 
its meaning might differ from one political actor to another that use it in policies. 
 
In the second chapter, I gave a brief history about the DP, the WP, and the 
JDP in order to understand the political environment at those times. In the last 
chapter, I try to categorize the parties in the classification of political Islam by using 
their political programs and policy implications. To use the definition of political 
Islam and its main features, I make a unique label for Turkish political life. 
 
Political Islam arguably is one political school of thought that uses the Holy 
book of Islam, the Quran, and the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, Hadith, in order to 
establish a new order under the name of Islam. Although both Islam and political 
Islam have regulations for cultural, political, economical, and social life, Islam has 
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nothing to say about the construction of a state system. It is the Islamic scholars who 
interpret the Quran in order to create the regulations of a society. As a result of 
different interpretations, in many Muslim countries, there are political institutions that 
are called Islamist, although there is much dissimilarity among them. In order to 
avoid any overlap and confusion by considering many cases, I specifically studied the 
Turkish experience of political Islam. 
 
In Turkey, since the multi-party system began in 1946, conservative and 
religious thought have had a huge impact on political and social life. In spite of the 
Welfare Partys clear impact on the process of political Islam in Turkey, as Lombardi 
(1997:196) argues, whatever the reasons for Refahs [Welfares] success, it was the 
secularists who first opened the door to Islamic organizations. The process began in 
the 1950s with the huge traditional Muslim support for Adnan Menderes. However, 
with the WP, political Islam achieved electoral success with an institutional 
expression of a modern social movement that strives to redefine sociocultural and 
economic relations through political meaning (Yavuz, 1997:66). Actually, Islam in 
politics was also seen in the 1980s after the military takeover. As Cook (2007:106) 
says, the military junta of 1980-83 saw Islam as an instrument to counter the 
growing power of the Left. So, the junta used Islam as an answer to the communist 
threat and depoliticization of the people. As a result, Refah and its leaders were 
unintended beneficiaries of these policies (Cook, 2007:107). 
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The JDP, on the other hand, did not appear in the Turkish political life 
suddenly. It is a fact that the leadership cadres of the party came mainly from the 
Welfare Party, which can be considered as an example of political Islam in Turkish 
political life. However, at the end of this study, I realize that except for the role of 
Islam in their private lives, the leadership cadres of the JDP can be considered as a 
center-right party. As Mert (Radikal, June 16, 2007) argues, it has more common 
alities than differences when compared with other center-parties in Turkey. However, 
unlike the Democrat Party, True Path or Motherland Party which are center-right 
parties in Turkish politics, JDP leaders are the first to come from an Islamic 
background.  
 
I studied Turkish political Islam by looking at party programs and the policy 
implications of the three Turkish political parties which have existed in different time 
periods of Turkey and I categorized these parties. I used Daniel Brumbergs 
classification which is more specific and more capable of differentiating among the 
three parties use of Islam as a political tool. In my classification, the Democrat Party 
and the Justice and Development Party can be called strategic modernists, whereas 










THE JUSTICE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
PARTY 
ECONOMIC POLICY & 
ROLE OF THE STATE 
- Liberal economy 
- Private sector 
ownership 
- Foreign loans & 
credits from IMF, 
WB 
- Open economy 
- Foreign investment 
- State-led economy 
under just order 
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system, IMF, 
WB 
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- Create Islamic 
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education 
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on religion and 
ethics 
RELIGION & MORAL 
VALUES 
- Call to prayer in 
Arabic again 
- Broadcast Quran 
recitations in 
Ramadan for 10 
minutes 
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praying 
- Dinner with leaders 
of regional sects 
in Ramadan 
- Build a mosque in 
Taksim square 
- Call adultery a crime 
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